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Notes and Comments
Moore v. Sims: A Further Expansion of the
Younger Abstention Doctrine
The federal abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris' re-
quires that federal courts refrain from interfering with pending
state criminal proceedings and with certain pending state civil
proceedings, except when the aggrieved party has no adequate
remedy at law and will stiffer great and immediate irreparable
harm if denied relief.' Moore v. Sims, 4 a recent five-four Su-
preme Court decision,' appears to expand the scope of the
Younger doctrine and clearly narrows the exceptions to it.
In Sims, state officials seized plaintiffs' children pursuant to
provisions of the Texas Family Code designed to protect chil-
dren in emergencies.6 After efforts to recover custody of the chil-
dren in state proceedings proved futile, the parents brought suit
in federal court challenging the constitutionality of several pro-
visions of the Texas Family Code.8 A three-judge district court
held that the Younger doctrine did not bar relief, and it en-
joined enforcement of the challenged statutes.9 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the lower court should have ab-
stained because Younger was properly applicable and the plain-
tiffs did not come within the exceptions to the Younger
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. The expansion of the doctrine since 1971 to include certain state civil proceedings
is discussed in notes 57-67 and accompanying text infra.
3. The limited exceptions to the doctrine are discussed in notes 87-109 and accom-
panying text infra.
4. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
5. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall joined.
6. The Texas Family Code authorizes designated state officials to take custody of
children in emergencies. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, ch. 17 (Vernon 1975). The relevant
portions of Chapter 17 are set forth in note 15 infra.
7. The state court efforts undertaken by the Simses to regain custody are set forth
at notes 20-26 and accompanying text infra.
8. Those provisions of Texas law challenged by the plaintiffs are discussed in note
27 infra.




Part I of this note details the circumstances of Sims. Part II
discusses the development of the Younger abstention doctrine
and its exceptions. Part III sets forth and analyzes the reasoning
of the Court. This note concludes that Sims extends the reach of
the Younger doctrine in three ways. First, by clarifying an ear-
lier decision,1' Sims brings within the scope of the Younger doc-
trine claims concerning matters that are ancillary to the pending
state proceedings if the federal relief would disrupt the state
proceedings. Second, Sims establishes an unexacting standard
for determining the adequacy of a state remedy and may allow
the mere theoretical existence of a remedy to preclude federal
relief. Third, Sims departs from established principles of moot-
ness by confining the scope of inquiry in evaluating irreparable
harm to only those circumstances that exist at the time federal
relief is granted. Thus, Sims enlarges the class of cases subject
to the Younger doctrine, and thereby further restricts access to
federal courts for vindication of constitutional rights.
I. Moore v. Sims: The Facts' 2
The Sims children lived with their parents in Montgomery
County, Texas, and attended public school in Harris County,
Texas.'" On March 25, 1976, in response to a telephone referral
from school personnel alleging that one of the Sims children
(Paul) had been abused, a caseworker from the Texas Depart-
ment of Human Resources 4 ("Department") went to the school
and took temporary possession of the three Sims children.'5 A
10. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979).
11. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
12. The facts presented are drawn from the opinion of the Supreme Court except
where otherwise noted. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
13. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
14. The Texas Department of Human Resources was formerly named the State De-
partment of Public Welfare. See TEx. HuM. REs. CODE ANN. tit. 2, ch. 11 (Vernon 1979).
15. The caseworker acted pursuant to Chapter 17, Title 2 of the Texas Family Code,
which provides for suits for protection of children in emergencies. The relevant sections
are as follows:
Section 17.01. Taking Possession in Emergency
An authorized representative of the State Department of Public Welfare, a
law-enforcement officer, or a juvenile probation officer may take possession of a
child to protect him from an immediate danger to his health or physical safety
[Vol. 1:149
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physician found that all three children had been battered.16 On
March 26, pursuant to the Texas Family Code, 17 the Depart-
ment instituted a suit in Harris County Juvenile Court for the
emergency protection of the children. On the same day, the
court issued an ex parte order18 which gave temporary posses-
sion of the children to the Department. 9
and deliver him to any court having jurisdiction of suits under this subtitle ...
The child shall be delivered immediately to the court.
Section 17.02. Hearing
Unless the child is taken into possession pursuant to a temporary order en-
tered by a court under Section 11.11 of this code, the officer or representative shall
file a petition in the court immediately on delivery of the child to the court, and a
hearing shall be held to provide for the temporary care or protection of the child.
Section 17.03. Notice
The proceeding under Section 17.02 of this code may be held without notice.
Section 17.04. Grounds and Disposition
On a showing that the child is apparently without support and is dependent
on society for protection, or that the child is in immediate danger of physical or
emotional injury, the court may make any appropriate order for the care and pro-
tection of the child and may appoint a temporary managing conservator for the
child.
Section 17.05. Duration of Order
(a) An order issued under Section 17.04 of this code expires at the end of
the 10-day period following the date of the order, on the restoration of the child to
the possession of its parent, guardian, or conservator, or on the issuance of ex
parte temporary orders in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship under this
subtitle, whichever occurs first.
(b) If the child is not restored to the possession of its parent, guardian, or
conservator, the court shall:
(1) order such restoration of possession; or
(2) direct the filing of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship in
the appropriate court with regard to continuing jurisdiction.
Section 17.06. Modification
On the motion of a parent, managing conservator, or guardian of the person
of the child, and notice to those persons involved in the original emergency hear-
ing, the court shall conduct a hearing and may modify any emergency order made
under this chapter if found to be in the best interest of the child.
Tix. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, ch. 17 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1978-1979). All of the sections
quoted herein were amended subsequent to the decisions in Moore v. Sims. The amend-
ments, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, ch. 17 (Vernon Supp. 1980), became effective on
September 1, 1979.
Possession of the children was taken pursuant to § 17.01.
16. On a showing that children are in immediate danger of physical injury, the court
may make an appropriate order for their care and protection. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit.
2, § 17.04 (Vernon 1975). See note 15 supra.
17. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.02 (Vernon 1975). See note 15 supra.
18. Tax. FAM. CODE AWN. tit. 2, § 17.04 (Vernon 1975). See note 15 supra.
19. Section 17.05 provides that such an order expires at the end of a 10-day period.
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On March 31, the Simses sought to present a motion for
modification of that order. Although a hearing on such a motion
is required by Texas law,20 the court clerk returned the papers
to the parents' attorney because the juvenile court judge was un-
available. Later that day, 1 in the same Harris County court, the
attorney filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. An April 5
hearing on the habeas corpus petition provided the parents with
their first opportunity to appear before the court since their
children had been seized on March 25. The merits of the dispute
were not addressed, however, because the judge determined that
venue was properly in Montgomery County;22 accordingly, he
transferred the proceedings to that county. On the same day, at
the judge's direction, 3 the Department filed a "suit affecting the
parent-child relationship,"24 which supplanted the March 26
emergency suit. In addition, and despite his determination that
venue was not in Harris County, the judge issued another tem-
porary order continuing the Department's possession of the chil-
dren.25 On April 6, the suit affecting the parent-child relation-
Upon expiration, the court is required either to order the return of the children to their
parent, guardian, or conservator, or to direct that a suit affecting the parent-child rela-
tionship be filed. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). See note
15 supra.
20. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.06 (Vernon 1975). See note 15 supra.
21. 438 F. Supp. at 1184.
22. The judge had determined that the children were residents of Montgomery
County. 438 F. Supp. at 1184. Section 11.04 of the Code provides that, with specific
exceptions, a suit affecting the parent-child relationship shall be brought in the county
where the child resides. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.04 (Vernon 1975).
23. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.05(b)(2). See note 15 supra.
24. Suits affecting the parent-child relationship are authorized by TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 11.02 (Vernon 1975):
Suit Authorized; Scope of Suit
(a) A suit affecting the parent-child relationship may be brought as provided in
this subtitle.
(b) One or more matters covered by this subtitle may be determined in the suit.
The court, on its own motion, may require the parties to replead in order that any
issue affecting the parent-child relationship may be determined in the suit.
25. This order was issued pursuant to Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.11 (Vernon
1975):
Temporary Orders
(a) In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the court may make any
temporary order for the safety and welfare of the child, including but not limited
to an order:
(1) for the temporary conservatorship of the child;
(2) for the temporary support of the child;
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/5
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ship was also transferred to Montgomery County.2 6
On April 19, the Simses turned to the federal court and ini-
tiated what became a broad-based challenge to several sections
of the Texas Family Code. 7 Alleging that the Code, while effec-
tuating a legitimate state interest, does so in a manner which
contravenes basic constitutional principles,28 the Simses sought
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief 9 and requested that
a three-judge district court be convened.30 Their request for a
temporary restraining order was denied on April 20, but a hear-
ing on their application for a preliminary injunction was set for
(3) restraining any party from molesting or disturbing the peace of the child
or another party;
(4) taking the child into the possession of the court or of a person desig-
nated by the court; or
(5) attaching the body of the child or prohibiting a person from removing
the child beyond the jurisdiction of the court as under a writ of ne exeat.
(b) Temporary orders under this section are governed by the rules governing
temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions in civil cases generally.
The parties disagree as to whether the juvenile court judge had jurisdiction to enter this
order. 442 U.S. at 421 n. 6.
26. 438 F. Supp. at 1184. The transfer was apparently made sua sponte under
§ 11.06(a), despite the requirement of this section that transfer be made upon a timely
motion. Id. The section reads:
Section 11.06. Transfer of Proceedings
(a) If venue is improperly laid in the court in which a suit affecting the par-
ent-child relationship is filed, and no other court has continuing jurisdiction of the
suit, the court, on the timely motion of any party other than the petitioner, and
on a showing that venue is proper in another county, shall transfer the proceeding
to the county where venue is proper.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.06(a) (Vernon 1975).
27. Portions of chapters 11, 14, 15, 17, and 34, title 2, Texas Family Code were chal-
lenged. Chapter 34 concerns the reporting of suspected child abuse and the initial inves-
tigative steps to be undertaken by the Department. Once suspected abuse is identified
under chapter 34, the state may take possession of the alleged victims. See TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.05(d) (Vernon 1975).
Although it is not clear from either the district court or Supreme Court opinion, it
appears that the complaint, as originally filed, contained all of the above challenges.
Conversation with John Quincy Carter, Attorney for Plaintiffs (March 21, 1980).
28. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
29. Id. at 1182.
30. At the time Moore v. Sims was filed, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 provided that an interloc-
utory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of a
state statute on grounds of unconstitutionality could not be granted unless the applica-
tion was heard and determined by a three-judge district court. Section 2281 was repealed
by Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976); the repeal was applicable, however, only to
actions commenced on or after August 12, 1976. Because Sims was commenced prior to
that date, a three-judge court was still required.
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May 5. In the interim, the Simses moved to file an original peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals. The motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction.
On May 5, the federal district court judge found that the
Department's custody of the children, which had continued for
forty-two days,"1 was not legal because the temporary orders is-
sued by the state court had expired. The federal court therefore
ordered that the children be returned to their parents. The De-
partment, however, was not enjoined from taking further action
to gain custody of the children."2 On May 14, in Montgomery
County, the Department did file a new section 11.0233 suit af-
fecting the parent-child relationship. The state court ordered
that Paul Sims be placed in the temporary custody of his grand-
parents, and it scheduled a hearing for May 21. When the
Simses could not be found for purposes of service, the hearing
was rescheduled for June 21.11
On May 21, the parents turned again to the federal district
court, wherein they sought and were granted a temporary re-
straining order addressed to the Montgomery County court. On
June 7, 1976, a three-judge federal court entered a preliminary
injunction prohibiting further proceedings under the challenged
statutes pending final determination by the three-judge court of
the plaintiffs' claims.
The three-judge court handed down its decision on October
12, 1977.35 The opinion first considered whether abstention was
appropriate under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris." The
court concluded that Younger principles were inapplicable. 7
First, the court stated that because "the action taken by the
State of Texas against the plaintiffs is multifaceted . . . there is
31. The Sims children were in the custody of the Department from March 25, 1976
to May 5, 1976.
32. The district court judge also noted that he was requesting a three-judge court to
consider the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the state statutes. 438 F. Supp. at
1183.
33. See note 24 supra.
34. The record indicated that the Simses avoided service of process by absenting
themselves from home, work, and school. Brief for Appellant at 8, Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415 (1979).
35. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
36. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).




no single state proceeding to which the plaintiffs may look for
relief on constitutional or any other grounds." 8 Second, the
court concluded that abstention would be inappropriate because
plaintiffs' challenge to the legality of the childrens' seizure and
detention without a hearing could not "be raised as a defense in
the normal course of the pending judicial proceeding."'"
Alternatively, the court concluded that even if Younger
principles did apply, Sims came within the exceptions to the
doctrine:40 as a result of the "failure of the state to follow its
procedures," there was no adequate remedy at law;41 and "'dep-
rivation of custody prior to [a] civil proceeding is an irreparable
injury which is both great and immediate.., and.., will not
be dissipated in the state proceeding.' "42 The court then ad-
dressed the merits of the challenge to the statutes and con-
cluded that several of the challenged provisions were unconstitu-
tional on their face as violating due process, and that other
provisions were unconstitutional as applied.43 The court perma-
nently enjoined application and enforcement of these provisions,
but did not award monetary damages.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist,
did not reach the merits because it concluded that abstention
was required.4 ' The Court found that the Younger doctrine did
apply and specifically rejected the district court's conclusions
that the state proceedings were inadequate for the presentation
of the plaintiffs' claims and that extraordinary circumstances ex-
isted creating great and immediate irreparable harm. 4" The Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the
38. Id. at 1187.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1187-89.
41. Id. at 1189.
42. Id. at 1188 (quoting Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782, 785 (W.D.N.C. 1973),
aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1139 (1974)).
43. Id. at 1195. The sections found invalid were 11.10, 11.15, 17.02, 17.03, 17.05,
17.06, 34.05(c), and 34.08 of Title 2 of the Texas Family Code. Sections 34.06 and
11.11(a)(4), used in conjunction with chapter 17, were found unconstitutional as applied.
438 F. Supp. at 1195.
44. Id.
45. 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The decision of a three-judge district court is directly
appealable to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
46. 442 U.S. at 423-35.
19801
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II. The Younger Doctrine
A. The Scope of the Doctrine
The nonintervention doctrine48 set forth in Younger v. Har-
ris'9 and its companion cases50 requires that federal courts re-
frain from directly interfering, either by injunction or declara-
tory judgment, with pending state court criminal proceedings5
unless the aggrieved party has no adequate remedy at law and
will suffer great and immediate irreparable harm if relief is de-
nied.2 Subsequent decisions have expanded the scope of the
doctrine to preclude direct federal court intervention in certain
state court civil proceedings e.5  In a more subtle expansion, fed-
eral courts have used the doctrine to bar claimants challenging
47. Id. at 435.
48. This nonintervention doctrine reflects a long-established judicial policy of self-
restraint. For a concise history of the development of the doctrine prior to its restate-
ment in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), see Zeigler, An Accommodation of the
Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safe-
guards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 269-82 (1976). See also
Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceed-
ings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591
(1975); Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 740 (1974).
49. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
50. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
51. Such relief is not precluded, however, when state action is threatened rather
than pending. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that a federal complainant who is threatened by arrest and state prosecution under an
allegedly invalid state statute might seek a federal court declaratory judgment regarding
the constitutionality of the statute. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975),
the Court extended the Steffel rule to requests for preliminary injunctive relief. See also
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Although access to a federal forum when state prosecution is merely threatened is
not precluded, such access was severely limited in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
In that case, the Court held that the principles of Younger should apply "where state
criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint
is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the
federal court." Id. at 349. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart criticized this rule as
"an open invitation to state officials to institute state proceedings in order to defeat
federal jurisdiction." Id. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
52. 401 U.S. at 43-44.
53. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text infra.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/5
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the constitutionality of state practices and procedures, even
though the claims concern matters that are ancillary or unre-
lated to pending proceedings." Typically, such claimants seek to
reform state procedures, but do not seek to enjoin state proceed-
ings. In addition, these federal claims generally cannot be raised
in the state proceedings.55 Nonetheless, in many instances, fed-
eral courts have held that to grant the relief requested "would
indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v.
Harris . . . and related cases sought to prevent.""
1. Expansion to Civil Litigation
Younger was first extended to civil proceedings in Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd.57 A federal district court had issued an injunc-
tion against proceedings initiated by the state to enforce a civil
nuisance statute."8 The Supreme Court emphasized that the
state was a party and that the statute was "in aid of and closely
related to criminal statutes."' 9 The Court concluded that a fed-
eral injunction would therefore offend the state's interest as sub-
stantially as would an injunction against a criminal proceeding."0
More recently, Juidice v. Vail 1 broadened the range of civil
cases subject to the Younger doctrine to include contempt pro-
54. See notes 68-86 and accompanying text infra.
55. Generally, these claimants seek to challenge state criminal pretrial practices and
procedures such as those concerning bail, transmittal of arrest records, and pretrial de-
tention facilities. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 68-86 infra.
56. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974). See also Martin v. Merola, 532
F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). In Martin, defendants in a pending state criminal
case brought suit in federal court against the state prosecutor. The federal plaintiffs al-
leged, inter alia, that their right to a fair trial had been infringed. Id. at 193. Although
the court dismissed on other grounds, it noted that Younger principles would require
abstention even though the federal claimants sought damages rather than an injunction.
Id. at 194-95. The court's citation to Younger seems appropriate because the federal
adjudication might have resulted in findings of fact which would have substantially af-
fected the state proceedings.
57. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
58. The state of Ohio had brought civil actions, under its obscenity laws, to abate
the showing of movies in a theater leased by Pursue. After the state issued a final order
of abatement, Pursue filed a federal complaint challenging the validity of the state ob-
scenity statute. Id. at 598.
59. Id. at 604.
60. Id. The Court characterized its holding as the "civil counterpart" of Younger.
Id. at 611.
61. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
1980]
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ceedings. 2 The Court stressed the importance of the state inter-
est in ensuring the regular operation of its contempt process and
expressed concern that federal intervention would reflect nega-
tively upon the ability of state courts to enforce constitutional
requirements." Further expansion followed in Trainor v. Her-
nandez," in which the Court held that Younger principles pre-
cluded a federal court from entertaining the claims of welfare
recipients who were defendants in a civil suit for welfare fraud
brought by the state.60 The Court appeared to indicate that the
Younger doctrine would apply generally to civil proceedings that
were brought by the state "in its sovereign capacity." 66 Whether
Younger principles now preclude federal court intervention in
all pending state civil proceedings to which the state is a party,
regardless of the substantiality of the state interest in those pro-
62. Vail had defaulted on a loan and a state court had entered a default judgment
against him. Three months later, the judgment remained unsatisfied, and Vail was
served with a subpoena. Vail did not appear, and the court subsequently issued an order
requiring Vail to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. When Vail
failed to comply with the order to show cause, the court entered an order holding him in
contempt and imposing a fine. Vail was arrested and jailed when he failed to pay the
fine. Vail then brought a class action in federal district court seeking to enjoin New
York's use of its statutory contempt procedures on the ground that the procedures lead-
ing to imprisonment for contempt violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Vail
had never appeared in the New York courts, he obviously had not raised his constitu-
tional claims in state proceedings. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found it "abun-
dantly clear that [Vail] had an opportunity to present [his] federal claims in the state
proceedings." Id. at 337 (emphasis in original).
63. 430 U.S. at 336.
64. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
65. Rather than prosecuting under the applicable Illinois criminal statute, the state
had brought a civil suit against the recipients, seeking return of public funds allegedly
obtained after fraudulent concealment of assets. The state had attached credit union
funds of those charged, and the attachment procedure was attacked in the federal dis-
trict court. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The district court
found Younger inapplicable: the court stressed that the state had brought its action
under a statute which provided a cause of action for any person, public or private; there-
fore, it was "mere happenstance" that the state was the petitioner in the pending state
proceeding. Id. at 760.
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the suit, although civil in nature, was
brought "to vindicate important state policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of
those [welfare] programs." 431 U.S. at 444. The Court remanded for further proceedings
to determine whether the pending state proceeding provided an adequate forum for the
presentation of the appellees' claims. Id. at 447-48.
66. 431 U.S. at 444.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/5
19801 MOORE V. SIMS
ceedings, has not yet been determined.6 7
2. Expansion to Litigation Challenging State Practices
and Procedures
A more subtle expansion of the Younger doctrine has oc-
curred through its application to plaintiffs who raise claims in
the federal courts concerning matters that are only ancillary to
pending state judicial proceedings. These challenges generally
seek to modify state criminal practices and procedures, but do
not seek to enjoin state prosecutions. Suits challenging the con-
stitutionality of assignment-of-counsel practices, 68 juvenile court
intake procedures, 9 and pretrial release practices70 are examples
of actions which concern matters ancillary to the pending state
proceedings. Some lower courts have reasoned that Younger
does not require abstention in these cases because the relief re-
quested entails virtually no interference with substantive aspects
of state proceedings and because the claims cannot readily be
raised in the state proceedings.7 1 Other lower courts have held
67. The Sims decision does not resolve this issue. See notes 131-32 and accompany-
ing text infra. The courts of appeals have applied the Younger doctrine in a variety of
civil areas. For an extensive collection of these decisions, see Aldisert, On Being Civil to
Younger, 11 CONN. L. REv. 181, 200-14 (1979).
Justices Brennan and Marshall have consistently opposed the wholesale expansion
of the doctrine to bar injunctions against civil proceedings. Justice Brennan has stated:
The principles that give strength to Younger simply do not support an inflexi-
ble rule against federal courts' enjoining state civil proceedings. . . . [I]n civil pro-
ceedings it cannot be assumed that state interests of compelling importance out-
weigh the interests of litigants seeking vindication of federal rights . . . under a
statute expressly enacted by Congress to provide a federal forum for that purpose.
Even assuming that federal abstention might conceivably be appropriate in some
civil cases, the transformation of what I must think can only be an exception into
an absolute rule crosses the line between abstention and abdication.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 455-56 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 341 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, JJ., dis-
senting). See generally Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 CONN. L. Rsv. 181 (1979);
Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical
Analysis, 1976 DuKE L. REv. 523, 548-73.
68. See, e.g., Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
69. See, e.g., Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973).
70. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912
(1976); Kinney v. Lenon, 447 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1971); Harrington v. Arceneaux, 367 F.
Supp. 1268 (W.D. La. 1973).
71. See, e.g., Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 472 n. 9. (D.C. Cir. 1975); Conover v.
11
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that abstention is required in such actions because granting the
injunctive relief requested would cause disruption of the state
criminal process and impair the ability of the state courts to ad-
judicate individual cases."
This conflict appeared to be resolved in Gerstein v. Pugh,"7
a civil rights class action brought by pretrial detainees to obtain
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Florida practice of
detaining persons prior to trial solely on the basis of a prosecu-
tor's information and without a judicial determination of proba-
ble cause. The district court granted the desired relief and or-
dered the defendants to submit a plan providing for preliminary
hearings in all cases instituted by information. 4 The Supreme
Court disagreed with the lower court on the merits,70 reversing
in part and remanding for further proceedings. 6 With reference
to the Younger issue, however, the Court stated that the lower
court did possess the power to enter its order. The Court con-
fined its treatment of Younger to a single footnote, stating:
The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for re-
lief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris .... The in-
junction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but
only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear-
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits.7
Thus, the conflict in the lower courts as to the proper applica-
tion of the Younger doctrine in challenges to state practices and
Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1090-92 (3d Cir. 1973); Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757,
762 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
72. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 912 (1976); Kinney v. Lenon, 447 F.2d 596, 599-601 (9th Cir. 1971); Harrington v.
Arceneaux, 367 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (W.D. La. 1973). See generally Zeigler, supra note
48, at 290-95.
73. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
74. Id. at 107-08. A final order subsequently issued by the district court prescribed a
detailed post-arrest procedure. Id.
75. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that, although the Constitution requires a
judicial determination of probable cause, the adversary safeguards ordered by the dis-
trict court were not required by either the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 119-26.
76. Id. at 126.




procedures seemed to be resolved; apparently, despite the dis-
ruption of the state criminal process that might result from fed-
eral court intervention, Younger did not bar relief.70
Although Gerstein and some lower court decisions seem to
indicate that abstention is not required in cases challenging
matters ancillary to pending state proceedings, abstention has
been required in cases making broad-based challenges and seek-
ing extensive reform of state judicial practices and procedures.
In O'Shea v. Littleton, for example, the plaintiffs mounted a
broad attack on the criminal justice system of Cairo, Illinois, al-
leging racially discriminatory practices by the state's attorney,
his investigator, the police commissioner, a county magistrate,
and a judge. The plaintiffs sought far-reaching injunctive re-
lief.80 The Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground that
the plaintiffs lacked standing, but stated in dictum that the kind
of relief sought by the plaintiffs would entail "abrasive and un-
manageable intercession"81 into the day-to-day conduct of local
criminal proceedings and would thus "indirectly accomplish the
kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . . and related
cases sought to prevent. 8 2 Similarly, in Ad Hoc Committee on
Judicial Administration v. Massachusetts,"3 a federal court of
appeals held nonjusticiable a case in which the plaintiffs asked
the federal judiciary "to order enlargement and restructuring of
the entire state court system."" The court noted that the scope
of the relief sought made it impractical, if not impossible, for the
court to formulate a remedy or determine compliance.85 Thus, as
indicated above, the principles of Younger abstention are more
readily applied when challenges are broad-based than when
challenges are limited in scope."
78. See Zeigler, supra note 48, at 296-98. In light of Sims, this interpretation may
no longer be supportable. See notes 138-44 and accompanying text infra.
79. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
80. Id. at 500.
81. Id. at 504.
82. Id. at 500.
83. 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
84. Id. at 1243. The plaintiffs alleged that the state's "failure to provide 'court facili-
ties, judges, clerical personnel, and other facilities' violate[d] their Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights." Id.
85. Id. at 1245-46.
86. See also Bonner v. Circuit Court, 526 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
1980]
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B. Exceptions to the Doctrine
The Younger doctrine is not an absolute bar to federal court
intervention even when a particular case comes within its scope.
Younger v. Harris itself provides that the federal court need not
abstain if the complainant has no adequate remedy at law and
will suffer great and immediate irreparable harm if equitable re-
lief is denied."7 The Younger decision, however, provided little
guidance for determining specific circumstances in which ab-
stention is not required. 88 One must look to other decisions to
give content to the exceptions to the Younger doctrine.8 9
1. No Adequate Remedy at Law
The Supreme Court has stated that a legal remedy, to be
adequate, "must be as complete, practical and efficient as that
which equity could afford."90 A complainant has an adequate
remedy at law if he is given "the opportunity to raise and have
timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues
involved." 91 The right to a direct appeal within the state court
system is an adequate remedy at law; thus, a federal plaintiff
must have exhausted his state appellate remedies before seeking
relief in the federal courts.2 Furthermore, only the opportunity
denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Karr v. Blay, 413 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
87. 401 U.S. at 43-45.
88. Such guidance as Younger does afford is discussed at notes 98-102 and accompa-
nying text infra.
89. See notes 90-109 and accompanying text infra.
90. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923).
91. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
92. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). The Court stated that even if
litigants are entitled to a federal forum for the resolution of federal issues, "that entitle-
ment is most appropriately asserted by a state litigant when he seeks to relitigate a
federal issue adversely determined in completed state court proceedings." Id. at 606 (em-
phasis in the original). But see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1977).
This raises the question of whether a plaintiff in a § 1983 action in a federal court is
barred by normal res judicata principles from relitigating federal constitutional issues
which were adjudicated, or which could have been but were not raised, in previous state
court proceedings involving the plaintiff. A number of Supreme Court justices have
noted that the Court has never expressly decided this question. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson,
421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 509
n. 14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a full discussion of the cases in the courts of
appeals and the district courts, see Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State
Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 191 (1972); Vestal, State Court Judgment as
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/5
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to present federal claims in state proceedings is required. A
plaintiff's failure to avail himself of such an opportunity does
not indicate that the state proceedings are inadequate. s
The federal courts generally have found that no adequate
remedy at law exists when there is no existing procedural mech-
anism in the state courts by which the federal plaintiff could
have presented his claim.9 4 Adequacy, however, is not assured by
the mere existence of a state mechanism; a state remedy which
exists only in theory may not be sufficient to compel federal ab-
stention. 5 Theoretically available remedies have been held inad-
equate when the state tribunal was found to be biased against
the plaintiffs," and when an adverse decision seemed inevitable
in light of prior state decisions, thus rendering illusory the avail-
able remedy at law.9 7
2. Great and Immediate Irreparable Harm
Younger v. Harris provides that great and immediate irrep-
arable harm99 may be inferred if the state criminal prosecution
Preclusive in Section 1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 185 (1974);
88 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1974).
93. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977); Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 252 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
94. See, e.g., Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973) (no state procedure
existed through which the federal plaintiff, at the time of his federal suit, could raise his
constitutional challenges to a Georgia statute mandating restitution as a condition of
probation).
95. Sims, however, indicates that merely theoretical state remedies may suffice to
render unavailable the inadequate forum exception to the Younger doctrine. See notes
169-80 and accompanying text infra.
96. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berrybill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Callahan v. Sanders, 339 F.
Supp. 814 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (injunction issued prohibiting justices of the peace from
hearing traffic cases when they had a pecuniary interest in conviction, because any chal-
lenge to their conduct in such cases would have to be made before the justices of the
peace themselves).
97. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1974); Anderson v.
Nemetz, 474 F.2d 814, 820 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1973); Detco, Inc. v. Breier, 349 F. Supp. 537,
538 (E.D. Wis. 1972); G.I. Distribs., Inc. v. Murphy, 336 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 913 (1973). But
see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350 n. 18 (1975); Anonymous v. Association of the
Bar, 515 F.2d 427, 434-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
98. 401 U.S. at 46. The "cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend
against a single criminal prosecution" do not constitute irreparable harm. Id. Moreover,
prospective harm is not irreparable if it can be eliminated by defense of a single prosecu-
tion. Id.
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is the product of bad faith and harassments or if the state law
to be applied is "'flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions.' "100 To suffice for Younger purposes,
the constitutional infirmity must pervade "every clause, sen-
tence and paragraph" of the challenged statute.101 Younger fur-
ther provides that other "extraordinary circumstances" may ex-
ist from which the requisite irreparable harm can be inferred.0 "
The courts have generally agreed that any unconstitutional dep-
rivation of liberty causes irreparable harm10 3 and that the risk of
99. Id. at 54. Bad faith, however, cannot be inferred merely from the innocence of
the accused. Rather, it must be shown that a statute has been enforced "with no expecta-
tion of convictions but only to discourage exercise of protected rights." Cameron v. John-
son, 390 U.S. 611, 621 (1968). See also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Nor can bad faith be inferred from
enforcement of a statute subsequently found to be unconstitutional. Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). Cf. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975) (allegation of collu-
sive actions of the Deputy Attorney General and members of the state supreme court
found not to support a finding of bad faith).
100. 401 U.S. at 53 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
101. Id. This standard has been interpreted so strictly that it is questionable
whether any statute could qualify, no matter how blatantly unconstitutional. A claim
that a statute is unconstitutional on its face does not suffice for Younger purposes. Id. at
54. The Younger Court implicitly overruled Dombrowski v. Pfister, id. at 53 (distinguish-
ing Dombrowski, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)), which held that abstention is inappropriate if
"statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied
for the purpose of discouraging protected activities." 380 U.S. at 489-90. In Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), a district court conclusion that the challenged statutes
were "on [their face) patently violative of the due process clause" was found by the
Supreme Court to fall short of the Younger requirement for invalidity. Id. at 439 (quot-
ing Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. Ill. 1975)). Such treatment, the
Trainor dissent opined, "actually eliminates one of the exceptions from the doctrine."
Id. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. 401 U.S. at 53. An indication of the types of circumstances from which great
and immediate irreparable harm may be inferred is found in Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117 (1975):
The very nature of "extraordinary circumstances," of course, makes it impos-
sible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient threat
of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in
state criminal proceedings. But whatever else is required, such circumstances must
be "extraordinary" in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for
immediate federal equitable relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly
unusual factual situation.
Id. at 124-25.
103. See, e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (see notes 48-50 and accom-
panying text supra); Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 1973); Gilliard v.
Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757, 761-62 (M.D. Fla. 1972). See also Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/5
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multiple prosecutions may also constitute irreparable harm.Y04
Moreover, it has been held that depriving a parent of custody
prior to a civil proceeding constitutes great and immediate irrep-
arable harm, regardless of the outcome of the civil proceeding.10 5
In determining whether a particular case comes within the
exceptions to the Younger doctrine, courts focus primarily on
the adequacy of remedies available at law."0 6 Indeed, a finding of
adequacy may obviate the need to consider the issue of irrepar-
able harm; if an existing remedy is found to be adequate, that
finding itself implies that any harm is repairable.10 7 Moreover,
although Younger provides that irreparable harm can be in-
ferred from bad faith and harassment, 08 these circumstances
can also be viewed as factors in measuring the adequacy of the
state forum. The various exceptions to Younger, therefore, can
be seen as "different ways of showing that the state legal appa-
769, 776 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
104. See, e.g., International News Distribs., Inc. v. Shriver, 488 F.2d 1350 (6th Cir.
1973); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972); International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
105. Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782, 785 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd mem., 414 U.S.
1139 (1974). In Burgin, the state assumed custody of a child after her mother was ar-
rested for possession of drug paraphernalia. The mother, after her release from jail on
bond, applied for a hearing to regain custody. The court refused to hear the case earlier
than the date already set, which was four days hence. Before the scheduled state court
hearing, the federal district court issued a temporary restraining order, returned the
child to the custody of her mother, and ordered that the state proceedings be stayed
until a three-judge federal court could consider the constitutionality of the statutes
under which the state had assumed custody of the child. The court found that "depriva-
tion of custody prior to [a] civil proceeding is an irreparable injury which is both great
and immediate," 363 F. Supp. at 785, and is thus sufficient to meet the irreparable harm
requirement for exception from the Younger doctrine. See notes 196-97 and accompany-
ing text infra (discussing the Sims Court's apparent rejection of this conclusion).
106. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447-48 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 337-38 (1977). Sims continues this trend. See text accompanying notes 198-99
infra.
Cases which find irreparable harm generally find the harm irreparable because state
remedies are inadequate for vindication of the plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Gil-
liard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
107. Courts also may focus on the adequacy of state remedies before assessing the
magnitude of the plaintiff's injury because the latter inquiry might lead the court to
comment on the merits of the plaintiff's allegations. A court that abstains will not reach
the merits. Thus, if a federal court determines that state remedies are adequate, it may
consider discussion of the plaintiffs injuries inappropriate, as well as unnecessary.
108. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
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ratus has broken down so thoroughly that federal rights cannot
be vindicated through it in a timely fashion."'' 0
III. Moore v. Sims: Decision and Analysis
A. The Scope of the Younger Doctrine
The Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court finds that Sims is within the scope of
the Younger doctrine as it has been applied to civil litigation
and to broad-based challenges to state practices and procedures.
The Court also finds that Sims is within the scope of Younger
because the relief ordered interfered with the pending state
proceedings.
First, the Court concludes that Sims is within the scope of
the doctrine as previously applied in civil cases. The Court rea-
sons that in Sims, as in Huffman,110 the state is a party to the
state proceedings;"' the child abuse statutes in Sims, like the
civil nuisance statute in Huffman, are "in aid of and closely re-
lated to criminal statutes;"'" 2 and the proceedings in Sims, like
those in Juidicel" and Trainor,'" were instituted to further a
state interest of vital concern."15
Second, the Court concludes that Sims is within the scope
of the Younger doctrine as previously applied to broad-based
109. Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55
TEx. L. REV. 1141, 1204 n. 259 (1977).
110. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See notes 57-60 and accompany-
ing text supra.
111. 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
112. Id. (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
113. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). See notes 61-63 and accompanying text
supra.
114. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). See notes 64-66 and accompanying
text supra.
115. 442 U.S. at 423. The Supreme Court and the district court agree that there is a
"compelling state interest in quickly and effectively removing the victims of child abuse
from their parents." Id. at 435 (quoting Moore v. Sims, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 (S.D.
Tex. 1977)). While the district court reasoned that the importance of the parental rights
involved militated against abstention, 438 F. Supp. at 1187, the Supreme Court con-
cludes that because "[flamily relations are a traditional area of state concern," 442 U.S.
at 435, it is preferable to assign first to state courts "the task of accommodating the
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challenges. The Court repudiates the suggestion, which it finds
intimated in the district court's decision, that "the more sweep-
ing the challenge the more inappropriate is abstention."11 e Jus-
tice Rehnquist states that such an approach "inverts traditional
abstention reasoning, 11 7 and points to "three distinct considera-
tions that counsel abstention when broad-based challenges are
made to state statutes:"" 8 the policies underlying the related
doctrine of Pullman abstention,119 the need for a concrete case
or controversy, and the "threat to our federal system of govern-
ment posed by 'the needless obstruction to the domestic policy
of the states by forestalling state action in construing and apply-
ing its own statutes.' ,,,2o Justice Rehnquist states that failure to
116. 442 U.S. at 427. The Court points to the following language in the district
court's opinion as suggesting this rationale:
The entire statutory scheme by which Texas attempts to deal with the prob-
lem of child abuse has been challenged and should be viewed as an integrated
whole. This court will not consider part of the scheme and abstain from another
part. To do so would seriously jeopardize any hope for an effective statutory
scheme and, in the name of comity and federalism, do violence to the state func-
tions those principles seek to protect.
Id. at 426 (quoting Moore v. Sims, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1977)). Although
the Court agrees that "a comprehensive attack on an integrated statutory structure [is]
best suited to resolution in one forum," 442 U.S. at 426 n. 10, the Court disagrees with
the district court's choice of forum. Id.
117. 442 U.S. at 427.
118. Id. at 428.
119. The Pullman abstention doctrine was enunciated in Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). According to Pullman, a federal court should postpone
hearing a constitutional question if (1) the claim before the court involves both an issue
of federal constitutional law and an issue of state law; (2) decision of the state law issue
might obviate the need for a decision of the constitutional question; and (3) the proper
resolution of the state issue under state law is unclear. Id. at 498-500.
Pullman abstention differs from the Younger variety in that the federal court
should, under Pullman, retain jurisdiction of the case while the parties obtain a resolu-
tion of the state law question in state court. Id. at 501-02. See England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). Moreover, under Pullman, a fed-
eral court may decline to exercise jurisdiction only if the preconditions are met, while,
under Younger, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction only in limited circumstances.
See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SVsTM 985-1009 (2d ed. 1973); Field, Absten-
tion in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 1071 (1974); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine
in an Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. REv. 604 (1967); Comment, The Abstention Doctrine:
Some Recent Developments, 46 TuL. L. REv. 762 (1972).
120. 442 U.S. at 429 (quoting Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S.
450, 471 (1945)).
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accord these considerations proper weight increases the dangers
of unnecessary or even meaningless litigation, 2' premature liti-
gation,122 and improper interference with state affairs.12 3 Thus,
the Court concludes that, the broader the challenge to a state
statutory scheme, the more appropriate is abstention.1 4
Third, the Court concludes that Sims is within the scope of
the Younger doctrine because the relief ordered directly inter-
fered with a pending state proceeding. In so holding, the Court
distinguishes Sims from the earlier case of Gerstein v. Pugh2 5 in
which Younger was not applied. As the Supreme Court notes,
the district court relied on Gerstein in finding abstention to be
inappropriate. The Supreme Court quotes the following passage
from the district court opinion:
[W]e note that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge is directed
primarily at the legality of the children's seizure and detention
for a 42-day period without a hearing. It is clear that because this
issue cannot be raised as a defense in the normal course of the
121. 442 U.S. at 428. As the Court indicates, a concern underlying the Pullman ab-
stention doctrine is that "a federal court will be forced to interpret state law without the
benefit of state-court consideration and therefore under circumstances where a constitu-
tional determination is predicated on a reading of the statute that is not binding on state
courts." Id. If the state courts subsequently give a different meaning to their law, this
may render "the federal-court decision advisory and the litigation underlying it meaning-
less." Id.
122. Id. at 429-30. In the Court's view, the decision below involved premature litiga-
tion of some issues. For example, the district court held that the Constitution requires a
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence in any proceeding affecting parental
rights, thus vitiating a portion of § 11.15 of the Texas Family Code which mandated only
a preponderance of the evidence standard. 438 F. Supp. at 1194. Since no state proceed-
ings involved in Sims reached the hearing stage, the plaintiffs could point to no injury
from application of the lesser standard. Thus, Sims did not present a concrete case or
controversy on the burden of proof issue. 442 U.S. at 429. Similarly, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the methods by which child abuse reports are received and recorded in Texas. 438
F. Supp. at 1187. They did not allege, however, that information concerning themselves
was disseminated in these reports, and, in fact, none was. Brief for Appellants at 28,
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). Thus, the plaintiffs could point to no injury in fact
from operation of the reporting and recording system, and their challenge to that system
apparently did not present a case or controversy.
123. 442 U.S. at 429-30. The Court states that "[when federal courts disrupt that
process of mediation [of federal constitutional concerns and state interests by the state
courts,] . . . they prevent the informed evolution of state policy by state tribunals." Id.
at 430.
124. Id. at 427.




pending judicial proceeding, abstention would be inappropriate.
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n. 9 (1975).136
In a brief discussion, the Court finds that the district court's
"reliance on Gerstein is misplaced" 12 7 because the relief ordered
in Gerstein "was not addressed to [the] state proceeding," while
the injunction in Sims "did address the state proceeding."', 8
Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
The Court's conclusion that Sims is similar to other civil
cases in which Younger has been applied is clearly correct. Not
only has the state brought suit to further a state interest of vital
concern, but child abuse statutes are indeed "in aid of and
closely related to criminal statutes.' ' 2 9 The protective purpose
of child abuse legislation is closely akin to the purpose of crimi-
nal statutes. Both regulate by defining proscribed behavior, by
giving notice that the proscribed behavior is prohibited, and by
establishing penalties for engaging in the proscribed behavior.
Were deference not given to the parent-child relationship, adults
who physically injure their children could be punished under ap-
propriate criminal statutes. Thus, the conclusion that Sims is
within the scope of the Younger doctrine is compelled by the
Huffman, Juidice, and Trainor decisions,"° even in the absence
of a mandate that Younger is to apply to all civil proceedings to
which the state is a party. The Court explicitly states that the
Sims decision is not to be construed as such a mandate: "There-
fore, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, we do not re-
motely suggest 'that every pending proceeding between a State
and a federal plaintiff justifies abstention unless one of the ex-
ceptions to Younger applies.' "'1 Because Sims is so completely
within the scope of the doctrine as it has been applied, it could
not be expected to, and does not, further clarify the boundaries
of the Younger expansion into civil proceedings.132
126. 442 U.S. at 431.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
130. See notes 57-66 and accompanying text supra.
131. 442 U.S. at 423 n. 8.
132. Nevertheless, one may wonder whether Justice Rehnquist's reference to
1980]
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The Court is also correct in stating that "[tihe breadth of a
challenge" to state practices and procedures "has traditionally
militated in favor of abstention, not against it."13 Further, Sims
is certainly an appropriate case in which to express concern
about the difficulties caused by broad-based challenges. Sims
poses serious questions of standing and justiciability,1 34  and
clearly illustrates the problems that may result from far-reach-
ing injunctive relief. The district court not only held unconstitu-
tional several notice and hearing sections of the Texas Family
Code1"' that were actually applied to the Simses, but also held
invalid several other sections that apparently had never been ap-
plied to the Simses. 1 6 Thus, Sims fully illustrates the Supreme
Court's point that in a broad-based challenge, abstention is ap-
propriate if such a challenge gives rise to premature and perhaps
"Younger-Huffman principles," id. at 423, does not presage the enunciation of a rule
that will draw within the scope of the doctrine all civil cases to which a state is a party.
133. Id. at 427 (emphasis in original). The Court properly relies on the policies of
comity and federalism underlying the Pullman abtention doctrine, but appropriately
refrains from holding that the Pullman doctrine by itself requires abstention in this case.
In Sims, the criteria for Pullman abstention, see note 119 supra, are not met as to all of
plaintiffs' claims. Pullman requires not only a federal constitutional question and an
issue of state law, a criterion met in this case, but Pullman also requires that the state
law on the state issue be unclear and that decision of the state law issue will obviate the
need for deciding the federal constitutional claim, criteria not met as to all of the plain-
tiffs' claims.
For example, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the provisions in
Chapter 17 of the Texas Family Code which authorize state officials to seize children and
deliver them to the court, and authorize the court to make appropriate orders for their
care, all without notice to the parents. See note 15 supra. Since this claim raises a consti-
tutional question, as well as issues of state law centering on the proper application of
Chapter 17, the first criterion for Pullman abstention is met. Chapter 17, however, is not
unclear on the point the plaintiffs raise. Section 17.03 specifically states that the court
proceedings authorized by Chapter 17 "may be held without notice." Tax. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 17.03 (Vernon 1975). It is difficult to conceive that a state court could read
that provision as requiring notice to parents; therefore, state court decisions as to the
meaning of § 17.03 will not obviate the need for deciding the constitutional question.
134. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
135. See note 43 supra.
136. These latter sections concerned such diverse issues as psychological and psychi-
atric examinations (§ 34.05(c), found unconstitutional on its face), the reporting and re-
cording of information (§ 34.08, found unconstitutional on its face; § 34.06, found uncon-
stitutional as applied), the appointment of an attorney ad litem (§ 11.10, found
unconstitutional on its face), and appropriate standards of proof (§ 11.15, found uncon-
stitutional on its face). 438 F. Supp. at 1190-95. See Brief for Appellees at 24, Moore v.




The Court's conclusion that the district court's reliance on
Gerstein was in error sheds some light on the interpretation of
Gerstein. In Gerstein, the Court found Younger inapplicable
because the plaintiffs' claims could not have been raised in de-
fense of their criminal prosecutions, and because the relief or-
dered was not directed at the state prosecutions and could not
have prejudiced the conduct of the trials on the merits.13 8 Thus,
Gerstein considered both the opportunity to raise one's federal
claims in the state proceeding and the impact of the ordered re-
lief on the state proceeding. The Court did not indicate, how-
ever, whether these concerns were of equal importance, or
whether lack of opportunity to raise one's claims would suffice to
render Younger inapplicable even if the relief would entail inter-
ference in state proceedings. In Sims, the Court appears to indi-
cate that lack of opportunity to raise one's claims is not suffi-
cient to avoid application of Younger if federal relief would
cause significant interference with pending state proceedings,
and, therefore, that the impact on state proceedings is the factor
of overriding importance.
Although the Supreme Court in Sims never expressly notes
that the plaintiffs in both Gerstein and Sims lacked adequate
opportunities to raise their federal claims in defense of the state
proceedings, the district court's conclusion that Gerstein and
Sims are similar in this regard appears to be correct. The plain-
tiffs' claims in Gerstein of illegal deprivation of liberty and the
plaintiffs' claims in Sims of improper deprivation of custody
both involve important, constitutionally protected interests. 3 9
In Gerstein, the constitutional claims concerning the plaintiffs'
original detention could not be raised in their state criminal
prosecutions because a state criminal trial involves only the de-
termination of guilt or innocence on the underlying criminal
charge. A claim of improper denial of a preliminary hearing and
consequent illegal pretrial detention is not relevant to that de-
137. See notes 121-22 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
139. A parent has a constitutionally protected right to the custody and control of his
child. See Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782, 785-86 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd mem., 414
U.S. 1139 (1974), and cases cited therein. Liberty, of course, is also a constitutionally




termination. Similarly, in Sims, the due process claims concern-
ing the original denial of custody could not be raised in the state
proceeding because lack of notice and hearing before the initial
deprivation of custody are not relevant to an inquiry concerning
parental fitness for future custody. Thus, the plaintiffs in Sims
apparently had no greater opportunity than did the plaintiffs in
Gerstein to present their federal claims in the state proceedings.
Instead of focusing on this similarity of Gerstein and Sims,
however, the Sims Court notes that the relief ordered in Ger-
stein, unlike the relief ordered in Sims, had no impact on the
state proceedings. The Court is correct in finding the cases dis-
tinguishable in this regard. The district court in Gerstein merely
enjoined the practice of pretrial detention based solely on a
prosecutor's information and without a judicial determination of
probable cause, and ordered the state courts to provide prelimi-
nary hearings in the future. 14 0 No pending proceedings were ac-
tually enjoined, and the plaintiffs' state criminal trials could
continue unimpeded. The district court in Sims, however, en-
joined the state from applying and enforcing the operative pro-
visions of the very statute under which the state proceedings
had been brought.14 1 In effect, therefore, the relief ordered in
Sims eliminated the possibility, until the state legislature could
enact a new statutory scheme, of any state proceedings pursuant
to the invalidated provisions.14' Thus, the Court appears to limit
the application of Gerstein to cases in which federal relief will
not interfere significantly with the state proceedings.
From this treatment, it may be inferred that, of the two fac-
tors considered in Gerstein, the impact on state proceedings of
the relief ordered is the factor of overriding importance, 1 4 and
140. 420 U.S. at 107-08.
141. 438 F. Supp. at 1195. See notes 15, 25 and 43 supra.
142. Thus, as the Court notes, 442 U.S. at 426 n. 10, the dissent seems to be incor-
rect when it says that the plaintiffs' claims were as irrelevant to the issue of their fitness
as parents as would be a hearing on a traffic violation. Id. at 439.
143. A question that may be raised with respect to Gerstein is whether the applica-
bility of Younger depends on the nature of the relief ultimately ordered or on the nature
of the relief sought. The answer to this question should depend on whether an appellate
court is asked to review a district court order denying, on Younger grounds, the relief
requested, or, on the other hand, to review a district court order granting specific relief.
In the first situation, the appellate court must necessarily look to the relief requested. In




the lack of opportunity to raise one's claims in state proceedings
is not sufficient, by itself, to avoid application of Younger. The
Court is correct in focusing on the impact of the relief; federal
relief that interferes with state proceedings is precisely what
Younger seeks to avoid. The Court does not indicate, however,
the means by which claimants may obtain relief on claims con-
cerning ancillary matters that cannot be raised in the state pro-
ceedings.""' It appears that claimants may still obtain relief in
the federal courts for such claims as long as the relief ordered
does not significantly interfere with state proceedings. Thus, de-
spite Sims, Gerstein may still support federal relief, provided
that the claimant carefully tailors his demands.
B. Exceptions to the Younger Doctrine
Federal relief is warranted in cases within the scope of
Younger only if plaintiffs have no adequate state remedy for
vindication of their federal claims and will suffer great and im-
mediate irreparable harm if relief is denied. The requisite irrep-
arable harm may be inferred from the existence of extraordinary
circumstances. 145 The Court concludes that Sims does not sat-
isfy these criteria and, thus, does not fit within the exceptions to
the Younger rule.
1. No Adequate Remedy at Law
The Opinion of the Court
Throughout its opinion, the Supreme Court addresses the
adequacy of state remedies and categorically rejects the district
court's findings of inadequacy. 46 The Court notes that a "fed-
eral court should not exert jurisdiction if the plaintiffs 'had an
opportunity to present their federal claims in the state
144. Perhaps the Court does not address this question because it ultimately finds
that the state proceedings provided an adequate forum for the presentation of the
Simses' claims. See notes 147-68 and accompanying text infra. In so finding, however,
the Court considers only the circumstances existing at the time the federal court inter-
vened. At that point, the children had been returned to their parents' custody. Thus, the
Court again fails to address the Simses' claim that the initial deprivation of custody was
illegal for lack of prior notice and hearing. See text accompanying note 191 infra.
145. 401 U.S. at 50-51. See notes 102-05 and accompanying text supra.





The district court found that there was no single state pro-
ceeding to which the plaintiffs could look for relief. 1 8 Referring
to the "multifaceted" nature of the plaintiffs' challenges,149 the
court found that certain of those challenges, particularly those
concerning the child abuse reporting system,'150 could not be
raised in the single pending state suit. 5 ' The district court also
found that the state procedures failed to provide an adequate
forum for the timely presentation of the plaintiffs' claims: "The
burdensome irregularities encountered by these plaintiffs in
seeking a state forum for their constitutional claims illustrate
. . . that in practice the state procedures operate in such a man-
ner as to prevent or, at the very minimum, substantially delay
the presentation of constitutional issues."152
The Supreme Court rejects the findings of the district court
and determines that the plaintiffs had not shown that state pro-
cedural law was inadequate for the presentation of their claims;
"in fact," the Court notes, "Texas law seems clearly to the con-
trary.'15 3 In support of this finding, the Court relies on section
11.02 of the Texas Family Code,154 which permits the court to
order the parties to a suit brought under the Code to replead if
the court determines that relevant issues have been omitted.155
In addition, the Court cites a recent Texas decision 15 which, the
Court states, "indicate[s] that under Title 2 the full range of
constitutional challenges is cognizable in the emergency removal
proceedings and in suits affecting the parent-child relation-
ship."9 7
147. Id. at 425 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977)). See notes 61-63
supra.
148. 438 F. Supp. at 1187.
149. Id.
150. See note 122 supra.
151. 438 F. Supp. at 1187.
152. Id. at 1189.
153. 442 U.S. at 432.
154. The relevant portion of § 11.02 is quoted in note 24 supra.
155. The Court also points to an article in the Texas Tech Law Review which stated
that § 11.02 adopts a liberal approach to joinder of claims and counterclaims. 442 U.S. at
425 n. 9 (citing Smith, Draftsmen's Commentary to Title 2 of the Texas Family Code, 5
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 389, 393 (1974)).
156. Matter of R.E.W., 545 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).




The Court recognizes "the delay in affording the parents a
hearing in state court,"'15 and the "undeniable" confusion" evi-
denced by "the uncertainty regarding the effective period of a
temporary order under section 11.111110l and regarding the pro-
priety of entering that order when venue was in Montgomery
County."16' The Court observes, however, that these irregulari-
ties do not indicate bad faith on the part of the state authori-
ties,162 and are only "the predictable byproduct of a new statu-
tory scheme."'1 3 The Supreme Court suggests that greater
diligence or other approaches were required of the plaintiffs to
test the adequacy of the state procedures."' "The question
would be a much closer one," the Court states, "had [the plain-
tiffs] diligently sought a hearing in Montgomery County after
the Harris County action was transferred or had they pursued
their appellate remedies."'165 In particular, the Court suggests
that plaintiffs should have appealed the original emergency or-
der '6 or renewed the motion to modify that order, 6 7 rather than
filing a petition for habeas corpus.1 68
App. 1976)).
158. 442 U.S. at 432.
159. Id.
160. See note 25 supra.
161. 442 U.S. at 432. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
162. 442 U.S. at 432. Nor was bad faith alleged. Bad faith, as it relates to the
Younger doctrine, is discussed at note 99 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore,
neither errors nor mistakes of state officials are, in and of themselves, special circum-
stances which justify federal intervention. See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 252
(5th Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 775-76 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 983 (1974).
163. 442 U.S. at 432.
164. Id. at 421, 432.
165. Id. at 432.
166. The decision notes that "[e]mergency orders are apparently appealable under
Texas law," id. at 420 n. 5 (citing § 17.07 of the Texas Family Code, and Matter of
R.E.W., 545 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)). Section 17.07, which was not mentioned
in the briefs of either party, reads: "Effect of Appeal: An appeal from an emergency
order made under this chapter does not stay the order." TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2,
§ 17.07 (Vernon 1975).
167. See text accompanying note 20 supra.





Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
The Court's conclusion that state remedies were adequate
to vindicate the plaintiffs' claims cannot be supported by the
circumstances in Sims. Although the Texas Family Code pro-
vides theoretical opportunities for the timely presentation of
many of the plaintiffs' claims, 16 9 as a practical matter, the plain-
tiffs were never afforded any opportunity to present their claims.
The Code provides for a mandatory hearing on a motion to mod-
ify emergency custody orders;170 the plaintiffs, however, were de-
nied such a hearing.17 ' In addition, a hearing on their first peti-
tion for habeas corpus did not provide an opportunity to present
their claims because it was determined that venue lay in another
county.17 2 Moreover, a second habeas corpus petition was denied
for want of jurisdiction. 7 Thus, the plaintiffs attempted to pre-
sent their claims in three separate proceedings, and, in each pro-
ceeding, they were denied the opportunity to do so.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs' opportunities to raise their
claims in Texas appellate proceedings are not nearly as apparent
as the Supreme Court implies. For example, careful examination
of Matter of R.E.W.,174 the Texas case cited by the Court as au-
thorizing "the full range of constitutional challenges" in emer-
gency removal proceedings and suits affecting the parent-child
relationship, reveals two separate procedural bars to effective
appellate consideration of such challenges. First, the Texas court
noted that although "[a]n appeal could have been taken from
the emergency order,. . . the appeal would not have stayed the
order.1' 7 5 Thus, even if one assumes that parents have an oppor-
tunity to raise a constitutional challenge before an emergency
order is issued, if the challenge is rejected at the trial level, the
allegedly unconstitutional denial of custody will occur before the
parents can raise their claims on appeal. Second, the court
stated that "[a]ny question relating to the temporary custody of
169. See note 15 supra.
170. See note 15 supra.
171. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
173. See text following note 30 supra.
174. 545 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).




the child was rendered moot upon the rendition of a final judg-
ment in the case terminating the parent-child relationship."11 6
Thus, once the parent-child relationship was terminated, the
court refused to consider constitutional objections to the proce-
dures by which the parents were initially denied custody. Such
invocation of the mootness doctrine greatly reduces the opportu-
nities of parents to present their federal claims in state appellate
proceedings.
The Court states that "[t]he question [of adequacy] would
be a much closer one had appellants diligently sought a hearing
in Montgomery County after the Harris County action was
transferred or had they pursued their appellate remedies. 117
The Court does not suggest that the course of action pursued by
the plaintiffs in seeking return of their children was unreasona-
ble, but only that it indicated insufficient diligence. It is not
clear why the many apparently reasonable actions taken by
plaintiffs fail to evidence diligent pursuit of state court opportu-
nities, nor is it clear why the Court would have found the ques-
tion of adequacy "closer" had plaintiffs taken further steps
which were likely to be equally inefficacious. Moreover, the
Court explains away the delay, confusion, and irregularities in
the state's actions as "the predictable byproduct of a new statu-
tory scheme. 1 7 8 The Court, however, does not afford the plain-
tiffs the same consideration when evaluating their actions which
were taken pursuant to the same "new statutory scheme."
By holding that state remedies in Sims were adequate to
vindicate the plaintiffs' claims, the Court actually may be modi-
fying the adequacy standard. Henceforth, the mere theoretical
existence of a state remedy may bar federal relief, no matter
how impractical or inadequate such a remedy would be in prac-
tice. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Trainor v. Her-
nandez:179 "Thirty years ago Mr. Justice Rutledge characterized
a series of Illinois procedures which effectively foreclosed consid-
eration of the merits of federal constitutional claims as a 'proce-
176. Id. See also Coleman v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 562 S.W.2d 554, 556
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
177. 442 U.S. at 432.
178. Id.




dural labyrinth. . . made up entirely of blind alleys.' Marino v.
Ragan, 332 U.S. 561, 567. '18o Texas parents could appropriately
apply that characterization to the state remedies which the
Court certifies as adequate in Moore v. Sims.
2. Great and Immediate Irreparable Harm
The Opinion of the Court
In the concluding portion of its opinion, the Court considers
whether Sims involves other extraordinary circumstances which
demonstrate the irreparable harm necessary to warrant federal
relief.' 8 The Court states that "[t]o gauge whether such ex-
traordinary circumstances exist in this case, we must view the
situation at the time the state proceedings were enjoined.' ' 82
The Court notes that the Simses had regained custody of their
children as a result of the May 5 order of the federal court;'83
that before the federal court issued either the May 21 temporary
restraining order or the June 7 preliminary injunction, the state
had instituted a new Chapter 11 suit seeking to place Paul Sims
in the temporary custody of his grandparents until a hearing to
show cause could be held;184 and that the writ of attachment and
the show cause order setting a hearing for May 21 had not been
effectuated because the parents avoided service.'8" Thus, the
Court concludes that, at the time the state proceedings were en-
joined, "Paul Sims was within the custody of his parents, and a
specific date had been set for the show-cause hearing regarding
180. Id. at 470.
181. The Court summarily holds that the facts do not support a finding of harass-
ment, 442 U.S. at 432, and that title 2 of the Texas Family Code is not "flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph." Id. (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). The district court
found that "several sections of the Texas Family Code are 'flagrantly and patently' viola-
tive of constitutional requirements." 438 F. Supp. at 1188. The Supreme Court's con-
trary conclusion is consistent with earlier case law interpreting this Younger exception
very strictly. See notes 100-01 and accompanying text supra.
182. 442 U.S. at 433. See notes 102-09 and accompanying text supra. The Court
defines extraordinary circumstances with a quotation from Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 124-25 (1975), quoted in note 102 supra.
183. 442 U.S. at 433-34. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
184. 442 U.S. at 433-34.




the writ of attachment, at which time the parents could press
their objections.' 186 The Court then states: "Unless we were to
hold that every attachment issued to protect a child creates
great, immediate, and irreparable harm warranting federal-court
intervention, we are hard pressed to conclude that with the state
proceedings in this posture federal intervention was
warranted."187
Finally, the Court rejects the district court's conclusion that
"[tihe denial of custody of the children pending any hearing re-
gardless of the result of the hearing, is in itself sufficient to pre-
vent the application of Younger."'' 88 Reasoning that "[flamily re-
lations are a traditional area of state concern," the Court states
that it is "unwilling to conclude that state processes are unequal
to the task of accommodating the various interests and deciding
the constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare liti-
gation.' 89 Accordingly, the Court reverses the district court
judgment and remands with instructions that the plaintiffs'
complaint be dismissed."90
Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
The Court does not explain or cite precedent for the pro-
position that only those circumstances existing at the time the
state proceeding is enjoined should be considered when evaluat-
ing whether extraordinary circumstances exist. If the Court is
suggesting that plaintiffs' challenges to the earlier deprivation of
custody were moot by the time the federal court enjoined fur-
ther state proceedings, case law seems to be contrary. As stated
in Allee v. Medrano, 9' "[iut is settled that an action for an in-
junction does not become moot merely because the conduct
complained of has terminated, if there is a possibility of recur-
rence, since otherwise the defendants 'would be free to return to
"[their] old ways."' -192 At the time the federal court injunction
186. 442 U.S. at 434.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Moore v. Sims, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1977)).
189. 442 U.S. at 435.
190. Id.
191. 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
192. Id. at 810-11 (quoting SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403,
406 (1972); NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 27 (1970); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
1980]
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was ordered, a new Chapter 11 suit affecting the parent-child
relationship had been instituted. The state court had issued a
writ in that suit, presumably without affording the parents no-
tice or an opportunity to be heard, directing that Paul Sims be
taken from his parents and placed in the custody of his grand-
parents.' Thus, the Department had returned to its old ways
just prior to the federal court order. If the parents had not ac-
tively evaded state officials seeking to seize Paul Sims, and if the
district court had refused relief, it is likely that the parents
would again have been deprived of custody without an opportu-
nity to contest, in advance, the constitutionality of the proce-
dure by which that deprivation would occur. Thus, the plaintiffs'
claims were not moot at the time the district court enjoined the
pending state proceedings. 1'
The Court also expresses reluctance "to hold that every at-
tachment issued to protect a child creates great, immediate, and
irreparable harm."'95 Thus, the Court appears to reject the con-
clusion in Newton v. Burgin'" that any deprivation of custody
368, 376 (1963); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); Walling v.
Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944)). In Medrano, union organizers had been
engaged in an effort to organize Mexican-American farmworkers. This effort led to con-
siderable local controversy and brought the organizers into conflict with state and local
authorities, who subjected the organizers to persistent harassment and violence. After a
state court temporarily enjoined the activities of the organizers, they brought a federal
civil rights action attacking the constitutionality of certain Texas statutes and alleging
that state and local officials had conspired to deprive them of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. A district court declared several of the statutes unconstitutional and
enjoined their enforcement, and the court permanently enjoined the officials from intimi-
dating the organizers in their organizing efforts. Id. at 813-16.
The state and local officials argued that the state injunction ending the strike had
rendered the controversy moot. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that "it was the
defendants' conduct, which is the subject of this suit, that ended the strike, not the state
court injunction, which came afterward. With the protection of the federal court decree,
(the organizers] could again begin their efforts." Id. at 809.
193. 442 U.S. at 434. See also notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
194. See also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v.
ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
195. 442 U.S. at 434.
196. 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973), affd mer., 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). The Sims
district court had, in part, based its finding of irreparable harm on Burgin. 438 F. Supp.
at 1187. Although the Supreme Court does not mention Burgin explicitly, it does quote
from that portion of the district court's opinion which relied on Burgin. 442 U.S. at 431.
The Supreme Court, however, omits the citation to Burgin which had been appropriately




prior to a civil proceeding is sufficient to meet the irreparable
harm component of the exception to the Younger doctrine. The
Court gives no guidance, however, for determining the period of
initial deprivation which is permissible. 197 In addition, by focus-
ing solely on the circumstances existing at the time of the in-
junction, the Court avoids considering whether the 42-day depri-
vation of custody suffered by the adult Simses constitutes
irreparable harm.
As noted in Part II, a finding of adequacy may obviate the
need to- assess the harm.198 Thus, while the Court begins this
portion of the opinion by considering whether extraordinary cir-
cumstances exist in Sims which establish irreparable harm, it
concludes by once again addressing the adequacy of state reme-
dies. The Court refuses to find that "state processes are unequal
to the task of . . . deciding the constitutional questions that
may arise in child-welfare litigation." 199 The facts in Sims, how-
ever, did not compel the Court to conclude that all state
processes were unequal to that task. The plaintiffs challenged
particular state processes provided in the Texas Family Code
and the manner in which the statutory provisions were applied.
Those processes seem to be "unequal to the task of" deciding
the constitutional issues raised by the Simses concerning their
42-day deprivation of custody. As Justice Stevens states in his
dissenting opinion, "the opportunity to be heard at a later ch. 11
hearing is, as the State accepts, too late to meet the require-
ments of due process and to afford relief as to the interim depri-
vation. ' 20 0 Thus, even if irreparable harm is to be measured by
the adequacy of state procedures, the state procedures in Sims
were apparently inadequate to repair the harm suffered by the
Simses.
197. Some guidance is found in Burgin, in which a five day period was held permis-
sible. The district court in Sims would have required that the initial ex parte hearing be
held, barring unusual circumstances, the very day of seizure. 438 F. Supp. at 1193. This
requirement seems incorrect in light of the cases which urge flexible due process stan-
dards and which allow that "extraordinary situations" will justify postponement of a
hearing until after the event. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Cafe-
teria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
198. See notes 106-09 and accompanying text supra.
199. 442 U.S. at 435.





The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. Sims
is to enlarge the class of cases that are subject to the Younger
abstention doctrine. The prior case of Gerstein v. Pugh ap-
peared to indicate that the Younger doctrine would not require
abstention in cases wherein the claims raised or the relief sought
concerned matters that were only ancillary to pending state pro-
ceedings. As refined by Sims, however, the Younger doctrine
does apply to claims concerning ancillary matters, if the claim-
ants seek federal relief that could disrupt pending proceedings,
notwithstanding the absence of a state forum for vindication of
federal claims. Thus, Sims appears to expand the scope of the
Younger abstention doctrine.
In addition, the exceptions to the Younger doctrine are se-
verely narrowed by the Sims decision. Younger v. Harris stated
that abstention is not required if the complainant has no ade-
quate remedy at law and will suffer great and immediate irrepa-
rable harm if federal relief is denied. Sims establishes an unex-
acting standard for adequacy and implies that remedies
available in theory, but not in practice, may now be sufficient to
meet the standard of adequacy. Moreover, Sims requires that
the extraordinary circumstances which demonstrate irreparable
harm must exist at the moment federal relief is sought; neither
past nor future circumstances will be considered relevant in
evaluating irreparable harm. Thus, by expanding the scope of
the Younger doctrine and narrowing its exceptions, Moore v.
Sims has further restricted access to the federal courts.
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